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MULTISTATE DEFAMATION: SHOULD
THE PLACE OF PUBLICATION RULE
BE ABANDONED FOR JURISDICTION
AND CHOICE OF LAW PURPOSES?©
By J.-G.

CASTEL*

I. INTRODUCTION

Books, newspapers, periodicals, radio, and television
programmes can easily be published, distributed, heard or seen
simultaneously almost all over the world today.
This rapid
dissemination of information gives special significance to the rules of
defamation which are designed to protect a person's interest in his
or her reputation.
The two principle elements of the tort of multistate
defamation, namely conduct and publication to a third party, take
place within the territory of two or more states
The resulting
injury to the reputation of the defamed person and his or her
damages may also be incurred in several states. Since these
elements are not all to be found in the same state they call for the
application of conflict of laws rules to determine whether the court
where the action for defamation is brought has personal jurisdiction
over the alleged defamer, and once such jurisdiction exists which law
it will consult and apply to the various issues involved as the law of
0Copyright,
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* J.-G. Castel. O.C., Q.C., SJ.D., F.R.S.C., Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall

Law School, Toronto.
1 The two elements of conduct and publication to a third party include the assembly of the
defamatory matter, its printing and distributing, or its broadcasting.
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defamation is far from uniform among the states or provinces of
North America. For example, the court will be required to decide
whether a given communication is defamatory, what constitutes
publication of the defamatory matter, where did it take place, what
are the circumstances under which publication of such matter is
protected by an absolute or qualified privilege, and whether proof of
special damages is essential to the plaintiffs recovery.
In the case of a multistate radio or television broadcast of an
alleged defamatory matter, the court may have to consult and apply
the law of each of the states or provinces where the communication
containing the alleged defamatory statement was published, or where
the reputation of the victim was injured or where he or she suffered
some damage. Otherwise, the plaintiff may have to bring an action
in each of these states or provinces. Conflict of laws problems may
still arise when the conduct and the publication both occurred within
the territory of the state or province where the action is brought but
some of the damage occurred elsewhere.
The major question discussed in this article is whether the
ordinary rules of the conflict of laws with respect to jurisdiction and
choice of law in the field of torts should be applied to multistate
defamation with their strong emphasis upon the place of tort which
is held to be the place of publication of the alleged defamatory
matter, therefore negating defenses that may be available elsewhere.
It is argued that rules of jurisdiction and of choice of law address
different concerns and that the test of place of publication should
not always be used for both purposes. It is also proposed that for
choice of law purposes the courts should apply the doctrine of the
proper law of the tort.
II. SERVICE EX JURIS BASED ON THE PLACE OF TORT
A. General
Most cases involving multistate defamation deal with the issue
of the assumed jurisdiction of the courts based on service ex juris.
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In the absence of the ordinary bases for personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, 2 provincial rules of civil procedure provide that:
[a] party to a proceeding may, without a court order, be served outside Ontario
with an originating process or notice of a reference where the proceeding against
the part consists of a claim or claims, ... (g) in respect of a tort committed in
Ontario.

However,
(1)

[a] party who has been served with an originating process outside Ontario may
move, before delivering a defence, notice of intent to defend or notice of
appearance,
a) for an order setting aside the service ...; or
b) for an order staying the proceeding.

(2)

Where the court is satisfied that,
a) service outside of Ontario is not authorized by these rules; ...
c) Ontario is not a convenient forum for the hearing of the proceeding, the
court may make an order under sub-rule (1) or such other order as is

just....

Thus, the defendant may ask for an order setting aside the service
or staying the proceeding if the service is not authorized by the
rules. That is, if the tort was not committed in Ontario, or if it was
committed in Ontario, on the ground that this province is not a
convenient forum.
The question whether a tort has been committed within the
jurisdiction is not always easy to answer. It depends upon the
nature of the tort. In the case of defamation - was it committed
in the forum or in some other jurisdiction, or in both places? No
difficulty arises where all the elements of the tort take place in the
same jurisdiction. It is when these elements take place in different
jurisdictions, as is often the case with newspaper articles and radio
2 In general the ordinary bases for personal jurisdiction over the defendant are: service within

the jurisdiction based on the presence of the defendant doing business within the jurisdiction;
residence within the jurisdiction; submission to the jurisdiction. See J.G. Castel, Canadian
Conflict of Laws, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986) at 187ff.
3 G. Watson & C. Perkins, Holmsted and Watson: Ontario Civil Procedure, (Toronto:
Carswell, 1984) Rule 17.02. For a discussion of the rules in other provinces, see J.G. Castel,
ibid. at 193ff.
4 Ontario Civil Procedure,ibid., Rule 17.06.
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and television broadcasts, that the courts must determine which
jurisdiction is the place of the tort.

In a leading Canadian case, Jenner v. Sun Oil Co. Ltd.,5 the
plaintiff who resided and carried on business in Ontario brought an
action against several United States' defendants for damages by
reason of defamatory statements made concerning him arising out of
radio broadcasts published by the defendants on the National
Broadcasting Co. radio network located in the state of New York.
The defendants applied to set aside an ex parte order for service of
notice of the writ of summons ex juris. The court based its decision
upon Rule 25.1(g) which authorized service ex juris in the case of
"a tort committed within Ontario"6 and held that the order should

stand as this was a proper case for service ex juris and Ontario was
the forum conveniens. The defendants had argued inter alia that the
action was not founded on a tort wholly committed in Ontario and
that Ontario was not the forum conveniens. On the question of the
place of tort the court stated:
I have come to the conclusion that there are fundamental and common-sense
principles which govern the present case. Radio broadcasts are made for the
purpose of being heard. The programme here in question was put on the air for
advertising purposes. It is to be presumed that those who broadcast over a radio
network in the English language intended that the messages they broadcast will be
heard by large numbers of those who receive radio messages in the English
language. It is no doubt intended by those who broadcast for advertising purposes
that the programmes shall be heard by as many as possible. A7 radio broadcast is
not a unilateral operation. It is the transmission of a message.

Relying upon various authorities 8 that support the view that
(1952), [1952] 2 D.L.R. 526 (Ont. H.C.).
6 Rule 25(1)(g) of the former Ontario Civil Procedure rules was identical to the present
Rule 17.02(g) except that under the former rule service exjuris had to be allowed by a court
order. This is no longer the case although such service may still be challenged afterwards:
see Rule 17.06 of Ontario Civil Procedure,supra, note 3. Also, today the originating process
is served rather than the notice thereof.
7 Jenner v. Sun Oil Co. (1952), [1952] 2 D.L.R. 526 at 535.
8 Hebditch v. Macllwaine (1894), [1894] 2 Q.B. 54 at 58 and 61, Lord Esher M.R.; Sheannan
v. Findlay (1883), 32 W.R. 122 (Q.B.Div.). The court rejected Bree v. Marescaux (1881), 7
Q.B. 434 (CA) a service ex juris case for damage within the jurisdiction involving slander
uttered abroad. The British Court of Appeal found that the "act done" outside the jurisdiction
which was the basis of the action was not made complete within the jurisdiction by the act
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publication of a defamatory statement to a third party is the very
essence of actionable defamation, 9 the court said:
The same principles apply to defamation by slander. A person may utter all the
defamatory words he wishes without incurring any civil liability unless they are heard

and understood by a third person. I think it a "startling proposition" to say that one
may, while standing south of the border or cruising in an airplane south of the

border, through the medium of modern sound amplification, utter defamatory matter
which is heard in a Province in Canada north of the border, and not be said to
have published a slander in the Province in which it is heard and understood. I

cannot see what difference it makes whether the person is made to understand by
means of the written word, sound-waves or ether-waves in so far as the matter of
proof of publication is concerned. The 1 tort
consists in making a third person
0
understand actionable defamatory matter.

The court concluded that it did not matter whether or not
the alleged defamatory words were written or uttered beyond the
jurisdiction if it was shown that there was a good arguable case "that
they were so transmitted as to be published within the jurisdiction
in such a manner as to be likely to cause the plaintiff to suffer
substantially in his reputation in Ontario.""1 On the question of
forum conveniens the court held that it was in Ontario.
Jenner v. Sun Oil Co. was applied in Pindling v. National
BroadcastingCorp.12 which involved a television broadcast allegedly
defaming the Prime Minister of the Bahamas. The broadcast had
originated in the United States and had been received in Ontario
either directly through American television stations or indirectly by
being picked up and relayed by some of the defendants' cable and
satellite television broadcast operators. The facts resembled those
of Jenner except that the plaintiff had no connection with the forum
and the principal defendant and the author of the programme could
not prevent the satellite television broadcast operators from
retransmitting the signals from the United States. The court
dismissed a motion by the defendants for an order setting aside the
of repetition by a third party.
9 See Bata v. Bata (1948), [1948] W.N. 366 (C.A.).
10 Jenner v. Sun Oil Co. Ltd, supra, note 7.
11 Ibid.
12 (1984), 14 D.L.R. (4th) 391 (Ont. H.C.).
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service of the proceedings exjuris and also held that Ontario was the
forum conveniens. The court rejected the defendants' argument that
the
service out of Ontario under Rule 25.1(g) required an intent by
13
National Broadcasting Corporation to broadcast into Ontario.
For the purposes of service ex juris Canadian and English
courts appear to hold that the tort of defamation is committed
where the defamatory matter is published and not where it is uttered
or printed. Publication takes place where the defamatory statements
are heard - where they are communicated. However, the rule is not
inflexible since the courts may decline to order service ex juris or set
it aside if the publication within the jurisdiction is only slight
elsewhere, 14 or if the forum is not a
compared with 1publication
5
one.
convenient
This would seem to indicate that the mere fact that
communication to a third party occurs in a particular jurisdiction
doqs not as such make that jurisdiction the place of tort. "There
must, in addition,16 be a substantial connection between the tort and
the jurisdiction."
Should the test of publication be the only relevant one for
determining whether or not the tort of defamation was committed
17
within the jurisdiction? In Petersen v. A.B. Bahco Ventilation et al.,
a service ex juris case involving a claim for damages for fraud and
13 See also, Composers,Authors and PublishersAssn. of Canada Ltd v. InternationalGood
Music Inc. (1963), 37 D.L.R. (2d) 1 at 7 (S.C.C.); Town of Peace River v. British Columbia
Hydro and Power Authority (1972), 29 D.L.R. (3d) 769 (Alta C.A.); Chinese Cultural Centre
of Vancouver v. Holt (1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 774 (B.C.S.C.). In Hubert and International
School of Music v. DeCamilis and CanadianAccordion Institute Ltd (1963), 44 W.W.R. 1
(B.C.S.C.) publication took place in three provinces. In Borowski v. Hurst and Toronto Star
(1984), 32 Man. R. (2d) 207 (Q.B.), the court held that defamation actions against newspapers
that are distributed in many provinces and countries need not be brought in the jurisdiction
where the owner or publisher resides. Therefore, it did not matter that the defendants had
no offices or assets in Manitoba. Compare Charles v. City News Co. (1928), 37 O.W.N. 41,
where the Master did not find that a libel had been committed in Ontario on the ground that
the defendant published and disposed of its newspapers only in the city of Chicago.
14

Kroch v. Rossell et Cie (1937), [1937] 1 All E.R. 725 (C.A.).

15 See Jenner v. Sun Oil Co Ltd, supra, note 7.
16 J.G. McLeod, The Conflict of Laws (Calgary: Carswell, 1983) at 99.
17 (1979), 107 D.L.R. (3d) 49 (B.C.S.C.). See, also, Ichi Canada Ltd v. Yamauchi Rubber
Industy Co. (1983), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 533 (B.C.C.A.).
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misrepresentation, the Supreme Court of British Columbia adopted
the real and substantial connection test for determining the situs of

the tort. The court relied on Moran v. Pyle National (Canada)
Ltd.,1 8 a case which arose out of fatal injuries sustained by an
electrician in Saskatchewan while removing a spent light bulb
manufactured by the defendant. The latter did not carry on business
in Saskatchewan and had no property or assets in that province. All

of the defendant's manufacturing and assembling activities took place
in Ontario with components being manufactured either in Ontario
or in the United States. The defendant sold products to distributors,
not directly to consumers, and had no agent or sales representative
in Saskatchewan.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the courts of
Saskatchewan had jurisdiction to entertain the action on the basis of
the commission of a tort within the province. Dickson J., speaking
for the court, reviewed in great detail the various theories adopted
over the years to ascertain the situs of a tort. He rejected resort to

any arbitrary set of rules and said:
Generally speaking, in determining where a tort is committed, it is unnecessary, and
unwise to have resort to any arbitrary set of rules. The place of acting and the
place of harm theories are too arbitrary and inflexible to be recognized in
contemporary jurisprudence. In the Distillers' case [Distillers Co. (Bio-Chemicals)
Ltd v. Thompson], [1971] 1 All E.R. 694] and again in the Cordova case [Cordova
Land Co. Ltd v. Victor Bros. Inc., [1966] 1 W.L.R. 793], a real and substantial
connection test was hinted at. Cheshire, 8th ed. (1970), p. 281, has suggested a test
very similar to this; the author says that it would not be inappropriate to regard a
tort as having occurred in any country substantially affected by the defendant's
activities or its consequences and the law of which is likely to have been in the
reasonable contemplation of the parties19

If this test were adopted in the case of defamation for the

purposes of jurisdiction, the place of tort would be the state or
province most substantially affected by the defendant's alleged
publication of defamatory matter or its consequences. Had it been
18 (1973), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 239 (S.C.C.) reversing (1972), 30 D.L.R. (3d) 109 (Sask. C.A.),
reversing (1972) 25 D.L.R. (3d) (Sask. Q.B.) and comments by Joost Blom, "Service Out of
the Jurisdiction - Tort Committed Within the Jurisdiction - Negligent Manufacture - Moran
v. Pyle National (Canada)Ltd" (1974) 9 U.B.C. L. Rev. 389; W.H. Hurlburt (1974) 52 Can
Bar Rev. 470.
19 Moran v. Pyle National (Canada)Ltd, supra, note 18 at 250 (D.L.R.).
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applied to Jennei2 0 and Pindling,21 it would have given jurisdiction
to the Ontario court in the former case and not in the latter.
The place of the tort of defamation could also be located
where the alleged defamatory matter was assembled or where the
plaintiff suffered injury to his or her reputation. Most likely, this
would be where publication took place or, in some cases, where the
defamed sustained damages. This may not be the place of injury or
the place of publication, although, generally speaking, defamation
when it takes the form of libel does not require allegation and proof
of special damage to establish the cause of action. 22 None of these
tests is free from ambiguity.
It should not matter which basis the court uses to exercise
its jurisdiction in order to enable the plaintiff to sue the defendant,
provided that the court applies the relevant law to the merits of the
case. With respect to jurisdiction, the major concern appears to be
easy access to the courts. Furthermore, even if the tort of
defamation was not committed within the jurisdiction, it would, in
most cases, still be possible to base the jurisdiction of the court on
23
the fact that the damage was sustained there or on other bases.
It would be unfair to the plaintiff to hold that, for the purpose of
jurisdiction, the place of the tort is where all the elements of the
cause of action have taken place.
Why not give jurisdiction to the court of the place where the
defamer acted or where the defamed suffered injury to his or her
reputation or where he or she sustained some damage, instead of
artificially defining the place of the tort as at one of these places?
For the purposes of jurisdiction, a tort may be recognized as having
20 Supra, note 5.

21 Supra, note 12.
22 Libel is actionable per se. The law presumes that some damage will flow in the ordinary

course of things from the mere invasion of the plaintiff's rights. Slander does require
allegation and proof of special damage unless it is slander per se. Note that in Ontario
defamatory words in a radio or television broadcast constitute libel. Libel and Slander Act,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 237, s. 2. In general see R.E. Brown, The Law of Defamation in Canada

(Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 289ff.
23 See, for instance, Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17.02(h) "in respect of damage
sustained in Ontario arising from a tort or breach of contract, wherever committed"; New
Brunswick Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 19.01(i).
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been committed in several different places whereas for choice of law
purposes this would be unworkable. Actually, any connection
between the territory over which the court has jurisdiction and the
parties or the elements of the tort of defamation should be sufficient
to give that particular court jurisdiction to hear the case. The
plaintiff would then be in a position to choose the jurisdiction in
which to bring his or her action with the safeguard that the
defendant could raise the plea of forum non conveniens. This
proposal would require a change in the rules of civil procedure.
B. Service ex juris and the Canadian Constitution
Although the territorial jurisdiction of provincial courts is
limited by the boundaries of the province in which they sit, thus
enabling them to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of service of
process within the province with respect to foreign and domestic
causes of action, such courts, as noted above, also exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over non-resident persons through service of
the originating process ex juris. This practice is valid under section
to matters falling within
92(13) of the ConstitutionAct24 with respect 25
the legislative competence of the provinces.
However, some provincial rules for service ex juris appear to
go too far by putting no express limits on the power to require nonresidents to defend local actions. This may be the case where
jurisdiction is based on the place of tort. A province must have a
substantial provincial interest to protect in order to subject a non24 (1867), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 as am. (U.K.).
25 See, Stairs v. Allan (1896), 28 N.S.R. 410 at 418-19 (C.A.); Exchange Bank v. Spinger
(1881), 29 Gr. 270 (Ont. Ch.); Standard Const Co. v. Wallberg (1910), 20 O.L.R. 646 (Div.
Ct); Cf. McGuire v. McGuire and Desordi (1953), [1953] O.R. 328, [1953] 2 D.L.R. 394

(C.A.): no jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum against a Quebec
jailer. See, also, Equity Accounts Buyers Ltd v. Jacob et la Banque Royale du Canada (1972),
[1972] R.P. 676 (Que. Prov. Ct): Quebec courts have no jurisdiction to order someone from

another province to come to Montreal and declare what he or she owes the debtor, Deacon
v. Chadwick (1901), 1 O.L.R. 346 (C.A.); Smith v. Smith (1953), [1953] 61 Man R. 105,

Hannon v. Eisler (1955), [1955] 1 D.L.R. 183 (Man. C.A.); Re Kenny (1951), [1951] O.R. 153,
[1951] 2 D.L.R. 98 (CA) at 164 (O.R.), 105-6 (D.LR.); Exp. Eli (1920), [1920] 1 W.W.R.
661 (Alta. S.C.). In general, see P.V. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto:

Carswell, 1985) at 276ff.
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resident defendant to its judicial jurisdiction.26 If the controversy has
a sufficient connection with the province for its law to be applied,
27
the provincial courts have jurisdiction over all concerned parties.
This view is consistent with the interpretation of the ConstitutionAct
that confers the right on a provincial legislature to act under section
92(14) when it has competence under section 92(13).28 Is mere
publication of defamatory material in the province a sufficient
connection to subject non-resident plaintiffs and defendants to its
courts?
III. CHOICE OF LAW AND THE PLACE OF TORT
A. The TraditionalCanadianRule
Ontario courts have adopted the English rule enunciated by
Willes J. in Phillips v. Eyre,29 which is as follows:
As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England for a wrong alleged to have'
been committed abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be
of such character that it would have been actionable if committed in England...
act must not have been justifiable by the law of the place where it
Secondly, 3the
0
was done.

This general rule was approved by the Supreme Court of
Canada and provincial courts on a number of occasions.

However,,

26 Moran v. Pyle National (Can.) Ltd., supra, note 18.
27 A. G. OnL v. Scott (1956), [1956] S.C.R. 137, 1 D.L.R. (2d) 433 at 141 (S.C.R.), 436

(D.L.R.): the provincial court may bind a non-resident to the extent that there exists
"recognized elements furnishing jurisdiction over him or the right."
28 See Valin v. Langlois (1879), [1879] 3 S.C.R. 1 at 89; Shields v. Peak (1882), [1882] 8
S.C.R. 579 at 591.
29 (1870), 6 L.R.Q.B. 1 (C.A.).
30

Ibid. at 28-29.

31 See, for instance, O'Connor v. Wray (1930), [1930] S.C.R. 231;

Canadian National

Steamship Co. Ltd v. Watson (1939), [1939] S.C.R. 11, 1 D.L.R. 273; McLean v. Pettigrew
(1945), [1945] S.C.R. 62, 2 D.L.R. 65, distinguished in Grimes v. Cloutier (1989), 69 O.R. (2d)
641 (Ont. C.A.). In general, J.G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1986) at 606-07.
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Canadian courts have not yet adopted the House of Lords' view that
"non-justifiable" by the law of the place of tort means civilly
actionable by that law only,32 thus overruling Machado v. Fontes33
which had interpreted "non-justifiable" much more broadly. Both
branches of the rule relate to choice of law.34
B. The Place of Tort
The second branch of the rule in Phillips v. Eyre35 requires
that the act which forms the basis of the action must not have been
justifiable by the law of the place where it was done. Thus, the
question of determining where the tort of defamation was committed
also arises in the context of choice of law. Should Canadian courts
adopt the place of publication of the defamatory matter as the place
of tort for choice of law purposes as they have done with respect to
jurisdiction? It is contended that rules of jurisdiction and rules of
choice of law address different concerns and that the same test
should not be used. If, for the convenience of the plaintiff, one
must allow him or her a wide choice including resort to the courts
where publication took place, the choice of jurisdiction should not
automatically attract the application of the law of that jurisdiction to
the merits of the case as it would encourage forum shopping. When
it comes to choice of law, one must determine which is the most
characteristic or substantial element of the tort of defamation and
not be governed by the convenience of the parties. The difficulty
32 Boys v. Chaplin (1971), [1971] A.C. 356 at 377 and 381, Lord Hodson and Lord

Wilberforce. See also Lord Guest at 358.
33 (1897), [1897] 2 Q.B. 231 (C.A.).
34 ANV. Dicey, Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, 11th ed. (London: Stevens, 1987)
Rule 205 at 1367. Boys v. Chaplin (1971), [1971] A.C. 356 at 384, Lord Wilberforce. But,

see Gagnon v. Lecavalier (1967), 63 D.L.R. (2d) 12, [1967] 2 O.R. 197 at 13 (D.L.R.),
198(O.R.); Canadan-Alberta Carriersv. Ford Motor Credit Co. (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d) 319
(Alta C.A.); Northern Alberta Railways Co. v. K & W. Trucking Co. (1975), 62 D.L.R. (3d)
378, [1975] 2 W.W.R. 763 which support the view that these two branches relate to the

jurisdiction of the court to try an action based on a foreign tort. However, this view has not
been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada or any Court of Appeal.
35 Supra, note 29.
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is that each communication is a separate publication that
gives rise
36
to a distinct cause of action governed by its own law.
It is true that in most cases defamation could be regarded as
being committed where publication takes place as it is usually there
that the defamed person suffered injury to his or her reputation.
However, the injury and some of the damage may also take place
elsewhere, for instance, where the defamed person resides or works.
Therefore, the place of damage may become relevant.3 7 It could
also be argued that the word "act" in the second branch of the rule
in Phillips v. Eyre refers to the assembling and printing of the
material and not its publication. However, since characterization of
a rule of conflict of laws has to be done in accordance with the lex
fori,38 one would have to examine that law to ascertain the essence
of the tort of defamation.
39
Mr. Justice Linden, in his text book on the law of torts
stresses that the prime purpose of defamation law is to protect the
good reputation of individuals in our society.40 Defamation is the
dissemination of information that tarnishes the good name of a
person.41 The very essence of defamation, be it libel or slander, is
publication - the communication of the written or spoken words to
36 Many states have adopted a single publication rule in the United States. In Canada this
is not the case although successive actions on the ground of separate publication are somewhat
restricted. See R.E. Brown, supra, note 22 at 280ff.
37 See J.G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986) at 613.
See, also, Abbot-Smith v. Governors of University of Toronto (1964), 45 D.L.R. (2d) 672
(N.S.C.A.), where some support is given by Isley CJ., obiter, to the view that the place of the
tort for choice of law purposes is where the damage is sustained.

38 Castel, ibid. at 68.

Note that Machado v. Fontes (1897), [1897] 2 Q.B. 231 (C.A.)

emphasizes the law of the place of publication: the plaintiff brought an action in England to

recover damages from the defendant for an alleged libel upon the plaintiff published by the
defendant in Brazil. The "act" done was the publication of the libel in Brazil.
39 A.M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988) c. 19 at 627-69.
40

Jbid. at 627.

41 bid. at 629.
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a third person other than the defamed42individual. "It is the fact of
publication alone which is actionable."
Professor J.G. Fleming also states that: "The essence of
tortious defamation lies in the communication of the disparaging
statement to someone other than the person defamed.... This
requirement is known by the name of 'publication'."43 With respect
to choice of law, he declares:
So also in the case of television or radio broadcasting, every reception can be sued
for separately so that a plaintiff can select the law most favourable to him in an
interstate transmission. In order to discourage such multiple litigation, some
statutes prohibit more than one action in respect of a multiple publication without
leave of the
court and allow evidence in mitigation of any previous recovery of
44
damages

These authors seem to indicate that publication is the essence of the
tort of defamation and not45 conduct, thus eliminating the place of
acting as the place of tort.
42 Ibid. at 646. Note that Linden J. states that "some element of fault is required.

If the

defendant intended that someone should hear the defamatory statements, therefore, there will
be liability. However, if he did not intend a publication and he could not, by the exercise of
reasonable care, have avoided it, he will be exonerated." (ibid. at 644 and cases cited).
Further on he states (ibid. at 647) that fault is relevant with regard to responsibility for
publication and he cites J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 6th ed. (Syndney: Law Book
Company, 1983) at 513 for the proposition that there is no liability for intentionally
defamatory matter published accidentally.
43 J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 6th ed. (Sydney- Law Book Company, 1983) at 507.
44 Ibid. at 507-10.
45 Note that Professor Joost Blom has argued that:
A strong case can be made for the proposition that the logic (such as it is) of the
rule in Phillips v. Eyre is that a defendant should not be liable in tort in the court
of the forum if what he did was regarded as lawful by the law of the place where
he acted. It would only be consistent with the idea to regard the locus delicti for
the purpose of the rule as the place of acting rather than the place of injury.
See Blom, supra, note 18 at 403. As for Professor G.H.L. Fridman, he is of the opinion that:
Where the defendant is ignorant of and unconcerned about the locality of the action
or a potential plaintiff, but scatters his defamatory material abroad, it might then
be argued that the place of publication is vital. If we are concerned with identifying
the essence or main substance of tortious conduct then in some instances, it is
suggested, it may be reasonable to investigate whether the allegedly wrongful
conduct is generalized in its scope and possible effects or may be considered as
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Although the courts in some common law jurisdictions have
adopted the test of publication for choice of law purposes,46 there
are no Canadian cases dealing with this problem. In Moran v.
Pyle,47 the Supreme Court alluded to the possibility that the test
might be different for choice of law purposes and in Inter-provincial
Co-op v. The Queen in Right of Manitoba,48 Mr. Justice Pigeon,
speaking for the majority, seemed to think that the jurisdictional test
was not applicable to choice of law. If one were to follow the test
of Moran v. Pyle, the place of the tort of defamation would be in
the state most substantially affected by the defamer's activity or the
consequences of that activity. The place of publication would no
longer be the dominant element. Professor J.G. McLeod does not
share this view and is of the opinion that although a tentative
solution has been reached for jurisdictional purposes in Moran v.
Pyle, this solution is not necessarily appropriate for the purpose of
defining the connecting factor for choice of law purposes. There
must be a sufficient connection between a particular set of facts and
more specific in nature. Negligence vis-t-vis the world at large (or at any rate a
class of persons which can be defined in a broad way) has no clear local connection

except, possibly, with the place where the alleged negligence occurred. A tort that
is aimed at or intended to affect a person or group in a specific locality, and only
such locality, may be more properly and closely identified with such locality. In this
connection perhaps it may be stressed that what should be considered as most
important is the intent or the foresight of the proposed defendant at the time that
he originally acted, and in relation to the place where he acted and place, if any,
where he intended or foresaw, or should have foreseen, that his acts would or could
have effect. If he had in mind at the moment of acting some place other than
where he in fact acted, then it might be argued that the legal quality of his act

should be judged by such place. If not, then the results should be different.
See "Where is a Tort Committed?" (1974) 24 U.T.L.J. 247 at 270.
46 See Gorton v. Australian BroadcastingCommission (1974), 22 F.L.R. 181; Maple v. David
Syme & Co. (1975), [1975] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 97 (Sup. Ct N.S.W.). See, also, Cawley v. Australian
ConsolidatedPress (1981), [1981] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 225 (Sup. Ct N.S.W.); Thomson v. Kindell

(1910), 2 S.L.T. 442 (Outer House). For an analysis of the situation in Australia see P.
Handford, 'Defamation and the Conflict of Laws in Australia" (1983) 32 Int'l & Comp. L.Q.
452. In reference to England, see P.R.H. Webb & P.M. North, l'houghts on the Place of
Commission of Non-Statutory Tort" (1965) 14 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 1314.
47

Moran v. Pyle, supra, note 18 at 242-43.

48 (1976), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477 at 515. Compare the dissenting view of the late Chief Justice
Bora Laskin at 501.
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a place to justify the application of the law of that place to the facts
49
in issue.
In England, the new approach is to look at the sequence of
events constituting the tort and to ask where in substance the cause
of action arose. The "substance" test is flexible enough to take
account of factors such as the nature of the tort alleged to have
been committed and its material elements in order to determine the
place of commission for choice of law purposes 50 It is one step
short of adopting the doctrine of the proper law of the tort. The
application of the law of the state which each issue is most closely
connected, instead of the lex loci delicti and the lex fori, would
reduce the importance attached to the place of tort and, therefore,
to the place of publication.51
The lex loci delicti and the lex fori coincide where the
defamation is found to have been committed in the forum. The
court will apply its domestic law even though the parties are foreign
citizens resident and domiciled abroad.5 2
It has already been mentioned that in the domestic law of
Canada libel is actionable per se, whereas this is not always the case
with slander which requires the allegation and proof of special
damage. Such damage may or may not be an element of tortious
liability, especially since defamatory words in a radio or television
broadcast constitute libel 53 Thus, it could be argued that the locus
of the libel and slander actionable per se is where the defendant
wrote or uttered the words complained of and that the locus of
slander not actionable per se is where the plaintiff suffered the
consequential damage. However, since the principal aim of the
Canadian law of defamation is to protect the plaintiff's interest in
49

Supra, note 16 at 194.

50 Dicey, supra, note 34, Rule 205 at 1386-87.
51 See text, infra, at 168-169.
52

Martin v. Mcneeley (1976), 10 N.B.R. (2d) 473 (Q.B.); rev'd on other grounds (1976), 12

N.B.R. (2d) 665 (C.A.).

Foreign law may be relevant only in exceptional situations:

Szalamay-Stacho v. Fink (1946), [1947] K.B. 1, [1946] 2 All E.R. 231 (CA.). In Ontario the

applicable law is The Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 237. For Canada in general see
R.E. Brown, The Law of Defamation in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1987).
53 See the Ontario Libel and Slander Act, ibid
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maintaining an unsullied reputation rather than punishing the
defendant,5 4 it would be better to ignore the distinction between
libel and slander, and, for choice of law purposes, to hold that the
place of tort, in the second branch of the rule in Phillips v. Eyre for
multistate defamation cases, is where the reputation of the plaintiff
has been most injured (i.e., where substantial damage is suffered, and
not in every jurisdiction where publication of the defamatory matter
took place). The plaintiff's right is invaded where his or her
reputation has been most injured.
The application of the law of the place where the defamation
did the most harm would simplify the application of Phillips v. Eyre
and achieve some certainty and predictability. It is also the place
most closely connected with the publication of the defamatory
matter. The application of the law of that place is most likely to
further the interests protected by the law of defamation.
C. The ProperLaw of the Tort
It is contended that Canadian courts should not necessarily
apply the law of the place of publication as that of the place of tort
for choice of law purposes but the proper law of tort, defined as the
system of law with which each issue involved in the alleged tort has
the most substantial connection.
In Phillips v. Eyre, Willes J. said that the foreign tort rule
was only applicable "as a general rule."55 This left the door open
for a flexible interpretation which was adopted in England by the
House of Lords in Boys v. Chaplin.5 6 Their Lordships added the
following exception to the general rule of double actionability by the
lex fori and the lex loci delicti: "A particular issue between the
parties may be governed by the law of the country which, with
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship with the
Linden, supra, note 39 at 627.
55 (1870), 6 L.R.Q.B. 1 at 28.
56 (1971), [1971] A.C. 356.
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occurrence and the parties."57 This exception originated in the
judgments of Lord Hodson and Lord Wilberforce. 58 If, as they
suggest, both the lex fori and the lex loci delicti can be displaced in
favour of a third system of law, the application of the lex fori to
torts deemed to be committed locally as a result of the publication
rule may be open to question. However, the editors of Dicey and
Morris consider the likelihood of this judicial development to be
highly speculative, especially in Canada, since neither Boys v. Chaplin
nor its ratio decidendi has yet been adopted by Canadian high

courts5 9 Publication within the jurisdiction should not affect the

application of the doctrine of the proper law of the tort as long as

legally relevant foreign elements are present.
The exception to the double actionability rule is modelled on
section 145 of the United States Restatement of the Law of Conflict
of Laws, Second:
The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties under the principles
stated in s. 6. 6 0

Section 6 lists choice of law principles:
Choice of Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive
of its own state on choice of law.
(2)

When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests
of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

Dicey, supra, note 34, Rule 205 at 1365-66.
58 (1971), [1971] A.C. 356 at 377-78, 380, and 391-92.
59 Dicey, supra, note 34, Rule 205 at 1409.
60

Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, Second (1971).
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As for section 145(2), it adds:
(2)

Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of s. 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.

The exception to the rule in Phillips v. Eyre61 ought to oust
either the lex fori or the lex loci delicti in an appropriate case, for
instance, where the parties have no connection with these places.
However, with respect to strict liability, the case for displacement of
the general rule in Phillips v. Eyre may be weak since it could be
argued that the standard of conduct is intimately connected with the
place where it occurred.
The Restatement of the Law of the Conflict of Laws, Second
contains some specific rules with respect to defamation. Thus,
section 149 states:
In an action for defamation, the local law of the state where the publication occurs
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, except as stated in s. 150, unless
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant
relationship under the principles stated in s. 6 to the occurrence
and the parties,
62
in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.

Each communication to a person is a separate publication for
choice of law purposes. Multistate defamation is dealt with in
section 150:
(1) The rights and liabilities that arise from defamatory matter in any one edition
of a book or newspaper, or any one broadcast over radio or television,
exhibition of a motion picture, or similar aggregate communication arc
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular
issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties
under the principles stated in s. 6.
(2) When a natural person claims that he has been defamed by an aggregate
communication, the state of most significant relationship will usually be the
61 (1870), 6 LR.Q.B. 1.
62 Supra, note 60.
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state where the person was domiciled at the time, if the matter complained of
was published in that state.
(3) When a corporation, or other legal person, claims that it has been defamed
by an aggregate communication, the state of most significant relationship will
usually be the state where the corporation, or other legal person had its
principal place of business
at the time, if the matter complained of was
63
published in that state.

On a number of occasions, Canadian lower courts have said
that they might have been prepared to adopt the proper law of the
tort if it were not for the long line of Supreme Court decisions
supporting Phillips v. Eyre.64 Whether the Supreme Court would
adopt the proper law of the tort as a general rule or as an exception
to the general rule in Phillips v. Eyre cannot be answered with any
degree of certainty. In Interprovincial Co-ops v. The Queen,65 the
63 See, also, Comment e. Multistate communication involving natural person, supra, note 59
at 459:
A state, which is not the state of the plaintiff's domicil, may be that of the most
significant relationship if it is the state where the defamatory communication caused
plaintiff the greatest injury to his reputation. This may be so, for example, in
situations where (a) the plaintiff is better known in this state than in the state of
his domicil, or (b) the matter claimed to be defamatory related to an activity of the
plaintiff that is principally located in this state, or (c) the plaintiff suffered greater
special damages in this state than in the state of his domicil, or (d) the place of
principal circulation of the matter claimed to be defamatory was in this state.
Other contacts that the forum will consider in determining which is the state of
most significant relationship with respect to the particular issue include (a) the state
or states where the defendant did his act or acts of communication, such as
assembling, printing and distributing a magazine or book and (b) the state or states
of the defendant's domicil, incorporation or organization and principal place of
business.
64 See Gronlund v. Hansen (1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 598 aff'd on other grounds (1969), 4
D.L.R. (3d) 435 (B.C.C.A.); La Van v. Danyluk and Danyluk (1970), 75 W.W.R. 500
(B.C.S.C.); Going v. Reid Bros. Motor Sales Ltd (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 201, 136 D.L.R. (3d)
254 (Ont. H.C.); Guerin v. Proulx (1982), 37 O.R. (2d) 558 (Co. Ct J.); Eades v. Hamilton
(1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 307 (Dist. Ct); Ang v. Trach (1986), 57 O.R. (2d) 300, 33 D.L.R. (4th)
90 (Ont. H.C.); Lewis v. Leigh et aL (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 324, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 442 (C.A.);
Donald v. Huntley Service Centre Ltd (1987), 61 O.R. (2d) 257 (Ont. H.C.). In Martin v.
Mcneely (1976), 10 N.B.R. (2d) 473 Stevenson J.of the Queen's Bench Division followed Boys
v. Chaplin,supra, note 56, and adopted both the proper law of a tort and actionability by the
1e loci delicti which was the lex fori. (Martin v. Mcneely was reversed on other grounds
(1976), 12 N.B.R. (2d) 665 (CA.).) For a recent review, see P. Bates, 'Foreign Torts: The
Canadian Choice of Law Rule" (1987) 8 Advocate Q. 397.
65 (1976), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477.
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Supreme Court of Canada declined to review the rule in Phillips v.
Eyre.
In England, in the libel case of the Church of Scientology of
California v. Commissioner of Metropolitan Police,66 the Court of
Appeal referred to Boys v. Chaplin. They acknowledged the
existence of a limited exception to the double actionability rule
enunciated by Lord Wilberforce, 67 namely, that the rights and
liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are to be
determined by the law of the state which has the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and to the parties.
In Sayers v. InternationalDrilling Co. N.V, a case involving
a claim for damages for personal injuries, Lord Denning M.R. said:
The issue raises an important question of private international law. On the one
hand, the claim by the plaintiff is a claim founded on tort. In considering that
claim, we must apply the proper law of tort, that is, the law of the country with
which the parties and the acts done have the most significant connection. That is
how I put is in Boys v. Chaplin, [1968] 2 Q.B. 1, 20. I think it is confirmed by what
though
Lord Wilberforce said in [1971] A-C. 356, 391-392, in the House of Lords,
68
he put it with more scholarship and precision than I could hope to do.

However, more recently, in Coupland v. Arabian Gulf Oil,69
also a claim for damages for personal injuries, Hodgson J., in the
Queen's Bench Division, discussed Boys v. Chaplin but applied the
general rule and held that the claim was actionable by the lex fori
and the lex loci delicti.70 His decision was confirmed on appeal.
On the question of the proper law, Hodgson J. stated:
It is clear that the ordinary rule of tort is that the law of the place where the action
is being brought - the lex fori - is the law to be applied.
To find an exception to that rule, one has to find an issue, which is decided
differently by the two jurisprudences, which is capable of being segregated and
which can then be decided by application of what, in effect the back door, is the
66 (1976), 120 Sol. J. 690.

67 (1971), [1971] A-C. 356 at 391-92. Note L Collins (1977) 26 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 480.
68 (1971), [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1176 (C.A.) at 1180.
69 (1983), [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1136 (C.A.).
70

Ibid. at 1145-50.

1990]

Multistate Defamation
proper law of that issue. But before one can do that
one has to have some
71
substantial difference between the two systems of law.

This passage would seem to suggest that there must be a difference
between the lex fori and the foreign law with respect to the issue of
the nature of the act alleged to be tortious or the defences available
before the proper law of the tort becomes applicable.
Whether Canadian courts should follow the criteria of the
Restatement of the Law of the Conflict of Laws, Second72 or the
governmental interest analysis of Professor Currie 73 would not make
too much difference, since the doctrine of the proper law of the tort
takes into account the relevant policies of the forum and of other
interested states.
In the case of defamation, in order to determine which law
has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and the
parties with respect to a particular issue, the court would examine
the law of the following places: where the defendant did the major
act of communication (i.e., assembling the material, printing,
distribution, broadcasting); the location of the head office; the
principal place of business; the residence, domicile and citizenship of
the parties; where the alleged defamatory matter was published; and
where the greatest injury and damages were caused to the reputation
of the plaintiff. The court would also ask whether the policies of
these places and of the forum would also be of relevance. Is the
forum primarily interested in protecting its citizens and residents?
The place of publication would only be one element to be taken
into consideration by the court.
Again, turning to the speeches of Lords Hodson and Lord
Wilberforce in Boys v. Chaplin,74 one finds that they did not attach
71 bid. at 1149.
72 Supra, note 60.
73 B. Currie, "Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws" [1959] Duke LJ.
171, and B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (Durham, N.C.: Duke University

Press, 1963) at 183ff. For a criticism, see J.G. Castel, Conflict of Laws, Cases, Notes and
Materials,6th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988) at 1-15 and K.F. Juenger, "Conflict of Laws:

A Critique of Interest Analysis" (1984) 32 Am. J.Comp. L. 1 which contains a survey of the
American conflicts cases in the field of tort.
74 (1971), [1971] A.C. 356.
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too much importance to the law of the place where the wrong was
committed, especially when it resulted from accidental circumstances.
Thus, even if one accepts the view that publication determines the
place of the tort, following Lord Guest, one could argue that the lex
fori should be disregarded when the publication of the alleged
defamatory material in the jurisdiction was purely accidental. The
ends of justice would be better served by giving effect to the law
which, in view of its relationship with the occurrence and the parties,
has the greatest concern with each of the specific issues raised in the
litigation.
To fix the liability of the parties, who are not residents,
according to a locality with which they have only an accidental
connection is unjust especially when it deprives the defendant of a
valid defence by another relevant law. In these circumstances the
application of the proper law of the tort would be justified as an
exception to the general rule in Phillips v. Eyre.
Where conduct and publication occurred in the same state
or province, this state or province would have a dominant interest
in regulating the defendant's conduct and in determining whether the
plaintiff should receive compensation for the injury to his reputation
unless he or she suffered substantial damage elsewhere. Where the
conduct and publication each occurred in a different state or
province the domestic law of the state of publication would most
likely be applied when the plaintiff has a settled relationship to that
state or province because of citizenship, residence, domicile or doing
business there. However, if the state or province of publication is
different, its law may not be relevant if it bears little relation to the
occurrence and the parties.
The application of the proper law of the tort alleviates the
difficulties that arise when publication of an aggregate
communication deemed to be defamatory took place in two or more
states or provinces. Only one law would be relevant instead of
applying the law of each of the states or provinces where publication
took place. Thp domestic law of the state or province where the
plaintiff has suffered the greatest injury to his or her reputation
would be most relevant and probably point to the law of the place
of domicile, residence, or business, provided this was also the place
of publication. The plaintiff, who has a right of action under the
domestic law of the state or province selected, would recover for the
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injury the communication has caused (or may be expected to cause)
in all the states or provinces in which the communication was
published. Whether this should also be the case with respect to
special damages of one kind suffered in75 one state and of another
kind in another state is open to debate.
D. Choice of Law and the Canadian Constitution
Does the application by provincial courts of their own
substantive law, as that of the place of publication, to non-resident
foreign plaintiffs and defendants violate the Canadian Constitution?
Is it possible to use the principle of territoriality as an instrument
of constitutional control over provincial choice of laws rules since
Canadian provinces lack the power to legislate extraterritorially?
There is no doubt that the provisions of the ConstitutionAct can be
used to establish minimum provincial standards in the conflict of
laws. However, to date, cases have not, strictly speaking, arisen in
the context of choice of law. Most of them dealt with the scope
of the exclusive powers of the provincial legislatures as the
Constitution Act limits provincial powers to matters "in the
province."76 The constitutional propriety of one province applying
the substantive law of another province or jurisdiction or its own
law to a dispute pursuant to its own choice of law rule appears
never to have been questioned. Presumably the forum's choice of
law rule is a valid aspect of "property and civil rights" in the
province, and the foreign law is applied in a formal sense as part of
the forum's domestic law.
In a recent article, Professor J. Swan suggested that questions
of choice of law should be resolved by governmental interest
analysis. 77 In the United States in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,78
75 The United States Restatement of the Law of the Conflict of Laws, Second (1971), s. 150,
comment d rejects the single law approach.
76 (1867), 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3 as am. (U.K.). See, also, P. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,
2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 269-75.
77 "rhe Canadian Constitution, Federalism and the Conflict of Laws" (1985) 63 Can. Bar Rev.
271.
78 (1981), 449 U.S. 301 at 312-13.
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the Supreme Court used an analysis of interests as a means of
testing the constitutionality of a state's choice of law rules: "For a
state's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible
manner, that state must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of
its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." In Canada, an
analysis based on the respective interests of competing provincial
jurisdictions in having their laws applied coincides with the
fundamental requirements imposed by the Canadian ConstitutionAct
that the pith and substance of provincial legislation must aim at a
valid objective within the province. 79 However, when the competing
foreign the government interest analysis becomes
jurisdictions are
80
unmanageable.
In Smith v. Smith, the Manitoba Court of Appeal stated that:
"The right of the province to legislate in respect of civil rights is
confined to persons resident in the province."ta Can it be said that
the application of its substantive law of defamation by a province
to non-residents, based on publication within the province, destroys
or interferes with their extraprovincial civil rights?82 It has been
held that the courts of a particular province cannot apply the
substantive statutory or common law lex fori to a legal situation that
is not sufficiently connected with that province.83 Thus, publication
within the province may not provide such sufficient connection
although it is the essence of the tort of defamation. The place of
publication standing alone is not the same as the situs of a movable
79 (1867), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 as am. (U.K.), and see InterprovincialCooperativesv. The Queen
(1976), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477; The Queen v. Thomas Equipment (1979), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 529

which deal with the regulation of extraprovincial activity.
80 See J.G. Castel, supra, note 73 at 1-15 to 1-24.
81 (1953), [1953] 3 D.L.R. 682 at 690. Here, the Manitoba Wives' and Children Maintenance

Act was held not to apply to persons resident in another province.
82 See discussion in P. Hogg, supra, note 76 at 281-82.
83 Re Upper Churchill Water Rights (1984), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297 reviewing previous cases

(impairment of extraprovincial rights may be accomplished validly by a provincial legislature
as an incidental effect of a statute that is in relation to a matter territorially within the
province and within a head of provincial legislative power: Hogg, supra, note 76 at 271).
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or an immovable which justifies the application of the local law of
that situs to non-resident foreign parties in litigation pertaining to
that movable or immovable.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the occasion arises in multistate defamation cases, it is
suggested that Canadian appellate courts, especially the Supreme
Court of Canada, adopt the proper law of the tort either as a
general principle or as an exception to the general rule in Phillips
v. Eyre. Thus, whether the tort is committed within or outside of
the jurisdiction, the courts would apply one proper law instead of
applying the lex fori or the law of each of the jurisdictions where
publication took place. If the courts are not prepared to do so, they
should reject the place of publication as the test for the
determination of the lex loci delicti. For choice of law purposes, the
tort of defamation should be deemed to be committed where the
plaintiff suffered the most injury to his or her reputation, that is,
where substantial damage occurred. Only one law would be
relevant. For jurisdiction purposes, the plaintiff should be given a
wide choice depending upon the circumstances and provided that the
court hearing the case applies the proper law and not its own law
as a matter of principle.

